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I. INTRODUCTION 
Structuring? What is that anyway? Well one might consider the 
structuring scandal behind Dennis Hastert, former speaker of the United 
States House of Representatives.2  Mr. Hastert’s former student accused 
him of sexual harassment during Mr. Hastert’s tenure at the accuser’s high 
school.3  Mr. Hastert, the longest-serving Republican speaker of the House 
of Representatives was charged with making cash withdrawals in a manner 
intended to avoid detection by bank officials, a crime known as 
structuring.4  The evidence against the former speaker indicated that he 
withdrew cash in $50,000 increments from several accounts to pay off the 
former student every six weeks for years.5 
After bank officials questioned Mr. Hastert about his actions, he then 
structured his withdrawals to amounts less than $10,000 in attempt to 
remain undetected.6  Mr. Hastert made 106 smaller withdrawals all under 
$10,000 and totaling $952,000 over the years he paid off his accuser.7  
Though federal prosecutors never charged Mr. Hastert with the underlying 
offense of sexual abuse, prosecutors charged Mr. Hastert with structuring 
 
 2   Conor Friedersdorf, Why Is It a Crime to Evade Government Scrutiny?, ATLANTIC 
(Jun. 2. 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/when-evading-
government-spying-is-a-crime/394640/ 
 3   Id.  
 4   Julie Bosman, Details About the Indictment of Dennis Hastert, N.Y. TIMES (June 9. 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/us/the-case-against-dennis-hastert.html 
 5   Id. 
 6   Id.  
 7   Id. 
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his funds to evade detection.8 
The anti-structuring provisions under 31 U.S.C. § 5324 are a product 
of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (“MLCA”), an amendment 
to the Banking Secrecy Act.9  The MLCA resolved the disputes amongst 
circuit courts including between the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
which held that a defendant who purchased several cashier’s checks 
totaling over $100,000 in cash to conceal the true origins of the funds was 
guilty of structing, but the First Circuit Court of Appeals failed to find a 
defendant who purchased twelve checks, all of which aggregated to more 
than $100,000 but none of which exceeded $10,000 guilty. 10  The MLCA 
statute—primarily aimed at curbing money laundering—mandated 
financial institutions to file currency transaction reports (“CTRS”) for 
transactions over $10,000.11  After the MLCA passed in 1986, there were a 
number of successful enforcement actions.12  Additionally, there were 
several amendments made to the statute, but most were technical and non-
substantive.13  For example, in 1992 Congress amended the statute adding 
sub-section 5324(b) which criminalized a failure to file currency and 
monetary instruments reports (“CMIR”).14 
Technical issues in the MLCA’s enactment and issues pertaining to 
the criminality a defendant must possess both plagued the money 
laundering statute.15  Among the issues that led to the 1994 amendment was 
the meaning of the word “willfully” within § 5324.16  Ratzlaf v. United 
States17 was the case that squarely placed this issue before the Supreme 
Court. 
At issue in that case was whether a heightened proof of knowledge 
was required to charge defendants.18  Specifically, whether the defendant 
 
 8   David Post, Anti-Structuring in the news!, WASH. POST. June 10. 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/10/anti-structuring-
in-the-news/?utm_term=.7c04bf19cb80. 
 9   Courtney J. Linn, Redefining the Bank Secrecy Act: Currency Transaction 
Reporting and the Crime of Structuring, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 407, 440 (2010). 
 10   Compare United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 1983) with 
United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 678-681 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 11   Money Laundering Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1986). 
 12   COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS: BANK 
SECRECY ACT REPORTING REQUIREMENTS HAVE NOT YET MET EXPECTATIONS, SUGGESTING 
NEED FOR AMENDMENT 23-25 (1981). 
 13   Linn, supra note 9, at 440.  
 14   See United States v. One 1985 Mercedes-Benz, 14 F.3d 465, 467 & n.4  (9th Cir. 
1994) (discussing the legislative changes to the Money Laundering Control Act). 
 15   Linn, supra note 9, at 444. 
 16   Linn, supra note 9, at 444. 
 17   Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994). 
 18   Linn, supra note 9, at 443. 
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knew their conduct brought them within the purview of the statute and 
whether the defendant also knew their conduct is criminal.19  The Tobon-
Builes and Anzalone circuit split was the catalyst for the 1994 Ratzlaf 
decision.20  The Supreme Court in Ratzlaf held that “willfully” meant that 
the defendant needed knowledge of both the wrongful conduct and 
knowledge that the conduct was criminal to violate the structuring 
provision.21  In repudiating the Court’s holding, Congress immediately 
amended the statute by deleting the statute’s use of the phrase “willfully” 
for all criminal prosecutions asserted under the statute, thereby eliminating 
the requirement that the defendant know the conduct was a crime.22 
The Ratzlaf decision and Congress’ willingness to amend the statute 
ties in with another potential issue with the current statute.  Specifically, 
there is a trend in some cases whereby prosecutors are charging defendants 
even though they do not have the requisite minimum cash requirement.  In 
the specific context of money laundering, defense attorneys sometimes 
assert the “cash hoard defense,” arguing that the defendant lacked the 
requisite minimum funds.23  This defense, commonly used by tax crime 
attorneys, argues that the defendant at no point had the minimum cash 
requirement on hand during the commission of the crime, therefore the 
defendant cannot be guilty as charged.24  In Ratzlaf, the defendant did have 
a cash hoard of $160,000 dollars which he broke into smaller chunks, but in 
subsequent decisions from circuit courts the defendants did not.25 
Some circuit courts have had defendant assert the cash hoard defense 
unsuccessfully.  For example, years after Ratzlaf, defendants from the 
Seventh and Eighth Circuits argued they were not guilty of the structuring 
statute because they never had the relevant “cash hoard” necessary.  In 
United States v. Van Allen26 and United States v. Sweeney27 the Seventh 
and Eighth Circuits respectively rejected the defendant’s cash hoard 
defense.  These cases are important because they provide key context on 
 
 19   Linn, supra note 9, at 443. 
 20   Id. at 445. 
 21   Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 142.  
 22   See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-325, Sec. 411, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (amending Section 5324 to include its 
own criminal penalty provision, now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)). 
 23   Blanch Law Firm, Cash Hoard Defense, (2012), http://taxcrimefirm.com/defenses-
to-tax-evasion/cash-hoard-defense/ 
 24   Id. 
 25   Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137 (discussing that defendant Ratzlaf had $160,000 in debt 
from playing blackjack at a casino that Ratzlaf “purchased cashier’s checks, each for less 
than $10,000” from different banks that Ratzlaf used to pay the casino and evade the bank’s 
obligation to report cash transactions exceeding $10,000). 
 26   See United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 27   See United States v. Sweeney, 611 F.3d 459, 472 (8th Cir. 2010). 
BENJAMIN(DO NOT DELETE) 6/1/2020  1:05 PM 
2020] RESTRUCTURE THE STRUCTURING LAW 315 
what the cash hoard defense is and why its uses were unsuccessful in the 
cases that follow. 
A few years after the Seventh and Eighth Circuit decisions, the 
defendant in United States v. Sperrazza from the Eleventh Circuit made a 
more persuasive cash hoard defense argument which was ultimately 
rejected.28  In Sperrazza, the court held that the “government may properly 
charge a defendant with structuring a transaction” even though the 
defendant did not have the requisite $10,000 in hand at any time.29  
Arguably more important is the  dissenting opinion, which argues a 
defendant needs to have the minimum cash requirement before they can be 
charged and prosecuted under the structuring law because the dissent is 
consistent with principles of statutory interpretation and the legislative 
intent.30 
An implication of Sperrazza and other subsequent courts’ decisions 
plays out in a few ways.  First, take for example a restaurant owner who 
goes to the bank every week to deposit approximately $9,000 dollars to 
avoid carrying copious amounts of cash and avoid robbers.31  Are they 
guilty of a crime? How about a bartender who makes about $2,000-$2,500 
a week in tips but never over $10,000 in a month? The bartender deposits 
roughly $9,500 every month into a bank account, with no knowledge a 
crime is being committed.32  Are they guilty of crime? If we accept the 
Sperrazza decision, both of these individuals could be guilty of a crime 
based on their pattern of conduct, though neither possessed greater than the 
requisite $10,000.33  The United States v. Sperrazza interpretation of 
section 5324—which disregards a fundamental requirement of the 
minimum cash of $10,000 a defendant must possess—could lead to a host 
of innocent people being prosecuted.  In other words, prosecutors should 
not solely rely on a pattern of transactions to charge and prosecute 
 
 28   United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 29   Id. at 1125.  
 30   Id. at 1129.  
 31   Id. at 1124 (discussing two hypothetical defendants with the first most likely guilty 
of structuring and the second innocent. “First, consider a defendant who has checks totaling 
$18,000 but decides to cash $9,000 today and $9,000 tomorrow in order to avoid the 
reporting requirement; there can be no question the defendant may be charged with one 
count of structuring in violation. Second, consider the defendant who has checks totaling 
$9,000 and knows he will receive another bundle of checks totaling more than $1,000 
tomorrow; in order to avoid the reporting requirement, he decides to cash the checks totaling 
$9,000 today.”). 
 32   Radley Balko, The federal ‘structuring’ laws are smurfin’ ridiculous, THE 
WASHINGTON POST (March. 24, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
watch/wp/2014/03/24/the-federal-structuring-laws-are-smurfin-
ridiculous/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.2d005c0b33f3 
 33   Id. 
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individuals under the structuring absent the minimum cash requirement. 
Part II of this comment provides a brief overview of what money 
laundering is and examines the current state of the structuring laws under 
the Bank Secrecy Act.  This section also examines how the enactment of 
the 1986 Money Laundering Control Act, the 1994 United States v. Ratzlaf 
decision, and how Congress reacted to Ratzlaf shaped the current 
structuring provisions. Part III discusses the cash hoard defense in broad 
terms, its failed uses in the Van Allen and Sweeney, and how these cases set 
the stage for the United States v. Sperrazza decision.  Part III provides an 
in-depth explanation of the Sperrazza majority and dissenting opinions.  
Part IV argues why the Sperrazza dissent accurately addresses the cash 
hoard issue.  This section also highlights how the Sperrazza decision 
implicates the rule of lenity, the decision’s policy implications, argues for 
legislative action in addressing the cash hoard issue, and recommends how 
the statute should be amended.  Part V concludes by re-introducing the 
issue, summarizing the argument, and re-highlighting the propose fix to the 
current structuring statute. 
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MONEY LAUNDERING 
Money Laundering is the process of legitimizing money that comes 
from illegitimate sources.34  Money laundering has three different phases: 
(1) placement, which refers to the introduction of the “dirty money” into 
financial institutions, (2) layering, which refers to concealing the source of 
that money through complex transactions, and (3) integration, which refers 
to placing the money back into the market as if it were from legitimate 
sources.35  Typically, but not always, the money comes from criminal 
activity.36  Individuals who intend to evade taxes and conceal the source of 
their funds could be guilty of money laundering.37 
 
 
 34   Investopedia, Money Laundering, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moneylaundering.asp(last visited Nov. 16, 2018); 
see also INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE ASSOCIATION, https://www.int-comp.org/careers/a-
career-in-aml/what-is-money-laundering/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (Money laundering is 
the generic term used to describe the process by which criminals disguise the original 
ownership and control of the proceeds of criminal conduct by making such proceeds appear 
to have derived from a legitimate source.” . . . “There are two key elements to a money 
laundering offence: [t]he necessary act of laundering itself” and “a requisite degree of 
knowledge or suspicion (either subjective or objective) relating to the source of the funds or 
the conduct of a client.). 
 35   Investopedia, Money Laundering, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/moneylaundering.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). 
 36   Id.  
 37   Anthony Verni, Money Laundering Is Tax Evasion, VERNI TAX LAW. (Feb. 25, 
2016), https://www.vernitaxlaw.com/money-laundering-is-tax-evasion/. 
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A. The Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and 
Foreign Transactions Act of 1970 (“Bank Secrecy Act” or 
“BSA”) 
The Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign 
Transactions Act is commonly known as the BSA.38  The BSA requires 
United States’ financial institutions to maintain records and file reports on 
currency transactions and financial institutions’ customer relationships.39  
Another purpose of the BSA is to use the reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements to investigate and uncover criminal, tax, and regulatory 
violations.40  The reporting and recordkeeping requirements were also used 
to conduct intelligence and counterintelligence measures and to fight 
against international terrorism.41  Congressional findings also suggests the 
global war on terrorism and stopping terrorist financing was a policy 
priority.42  Another purpose was to combat criminal, tax, and regulatory 
violations.43  Using the reports to prosecute money laundering and other 
financial crimes was another goal of the BSA.44 
The BSA also requires individuals, banks, and other financial 
institutions to file currency transaction reports (“CTRs”) and Suspicious 
Activity Reports (“SARs”) with the United States Department of 
Treasury.45  These reports are used to identify individuals who may be 
subject to the criminal, tax, and terrorism enforcement actions.46  The main 
use of the CTRs has been to help track large amounts of cash generated by 
individuals and entities used for illegal purposes.47  The SARs are used by 
financial institutions to report identified or potentially illegal activities.48  
In sum while CTRs are used to identify individuals, SARs have been used 
to identify the activities in which these individuals engage.49 
The BSA consists of two main parts: Title I which requires financial 
recordkeeping and Title II which requires reports of currency and foreign 
 
 38   Financial Recordkeeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions of 
1970, 31 U.S.C. § 5311 (1970). 
 39   Id. 
 40   Id.  
 41   Id. 
 42   Id. 
 43  FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANKING SECRECY ACT 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL (2014).  
 44   Id.  
 45   Id. 
 46   Id.  
 47   FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, BANK SECRECY ACT, ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING, AND OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL SAFETY MANUAL, (2004). 
 48   Id. 
 49   Id. 
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transactions.50 The BSA regulations clarified that financial institutions, 
banks, and other individuals were only obligated to file CTRs if the 
“currency or other monetary instruments in an aggregate amount 
exceed[ed] $10,000 at one time.”51  The BSA generally defines financial 
institutions as banks, credit unions, private bankers, and investment 
companies.52  Though the BSA does not provide a specific definitional 
section for individuals within reporting requirements, these individuals are 
grouped as financial agencies.53  A financial agent means exactly what one 
might think, a person acting as an agent of any one of the financial 
institutions listed within the BSA.54  The reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements applies to both transactions involving United States 
currencies55 and foreign currencies.56 
Over the years, the BSA has been amended several times through 
different acts including:  (1) the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986; 
(2) Annuzio-Wylie Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1992; (3) Money 
Laundering Suppression Act of 1994; (4) Money Laundering and Financial 
Crimes Strategy Act of 1998; and (5) the Uniting and Strengthening 
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act better known as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.57 
Of relevance is the Money Laundering Control Act, which produced the 
current anti-structuring provisions that this comment examines. 
B. The Birth of the Money Laundering Control Act (“MLCA”) of 
1986 
Following the enactment of the BSA, there was a prolonged period 
with minimal enforcement actions for BSA violators.58  Things changed 
after the Bank of Boston was fined $500,000 for violations of the BSA’s 
 
 50   Id. 
 51   31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1987). 
 52   31 U.S.C. § 5312 (1970). 
 53   Id. 
 54   Id. 
 55   31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1970). 
 56   31 U.S.C. § 5314 (1970). 
 57   FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, BANK SECRECY ACT, ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING, AND OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL SAFETY MANUAL, (2004); see 
also Linn, supra note 9, at 441-44 (“In 1992 Congress amended § 5324(a) to make it a 
crime to structure financial transactions to evade the reporting and recordkeeping 
requirement relating to the cash purchase of cashier’s checks and similar instruments in 
amounts of $ 3000 or greater. In 2001, Congress expanded the reach of § 5324(a) again by 
prohibiting structuring to evade the recordkeeping requirement relating to wire transfers in 
amounts of $ 3000 and greater.”). 
 58   Linn, supra note 9, at 407 (“After a prolonged period of inaction that lasted well 
into the 1980s, financial institutions complied with the BSA’s requirements by sending 
ever-increasing numbers of reports to the government.”). 
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reporting requirements.59  In United States v. Bank of New England,60 the 
Bank of Boston was fined because it exempted a known criminal 
organization from CTR filing requirements.  In the case, the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s jury instructions, which allowed 
the jury to find the bank criminally liable.61  The jury concluded because 
some bank employees had sufficient knowledge of the reporting 
requirements vis-à-vis the theory of respondent superior, the bank could 
also be criminally liable.62 
In Bank of New England, a customer visited a branch of the Bank of 
New England several times a month to withdraw large sums of cash from 
various corporate accounts.63  During thirty one independent visits, the 
customer requested blank checks from the cashier and then made those 
checks payable as cash in amounts between $5,000 and $9,000, all less than 
the BSA’s $10,000 requirement.64  The bank did not file currency 
transaction reports on any of these transactions until it received a grand 
jury subpoena.65 
On appeal, the bank argued lack of notice, alleging the statute did not 
specify that there would be criminal culpability for failure to file CTRs, 
especially for customers who used checks.66 The bank also argued lack of 
intent, alleging it did not willfully fail to file CTRs.67 The court rejected the 
notice argument, holding the language of the regulation gave the bank 
“adequate warning that a single, lump-sum transfer of cashing exceeding 
$10,000 was reportable” and that the customer’s recurring practice should 
have given the “bank fair warning that [defendant’s] transactions were 
reportable.”68  The court ultimately held the bank willfully failed to file 
CTRs because the aggregate knowledge of the particular operation was 
sufficient, thereby rejecting the bank’s lack of intent argument.69 
 
 
 59   United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 60   Id. 
 61   Id. at 857.  
 62   Id. 
 63   Id. at 848. 
 64   Id. (“[Defendant] withdrew from the Prudential Branch of the Bank more than $ 
10,000 in cash by using multiple checks—each one individually under $ 10,000—presented 
simultaneously to a single bank teller.”). 
 65   United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 848 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 66   Id. 
 67   Id. at 847. 
 68   Id. at 848-49. 
 69   Id. at 856. 
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1. The catalyst of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. 
The decision led to a new widespread compliance with the BSA by 
financial institutions helping achieve the BSA’s goal of prosecuting money 
launderers, tax evaders, and other individuals who intended to keep their 
criminal, financial dealings a secret.70  In the 1980s, as a result of the 
increased compliance and enforcement actions, individuals “structure[d]” 
their transactions as a way around the BSA’s recordkeeping and reporting 
requirements.71  While the Bank of New England case put banks on notice 
of banks’ reporting requirements, two other cases ultimately led to the 
enactment of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986.72 
In the 1983 Tobon-Builes case, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
held a defendant who purchased several cashier’s checks totaling 
$185,2000 in cash to conceal the true origin of the funds was guilty under 
18 U.S.C. § 1001.73  In its holding the court stated “the government charged 
and proved that [defendant] willfully and knowingly caused financial 
institutions not to report currency transactions that they had a duty to 
report.”74  The defendant in Tobon-Builes went to several banks in Florida 
and purchased cashier’s checks in amounts less than $10,000 while using a 
variety of aliases to conceal his transactions.75  The defendant argued he 
was under no legal duty to report any of his cash transactions.76  The court 
rejected this argument finding it inapplicable and reasoned that the statute 
does apply to individuals as well as financial institutions.77  The fact that 
the defendant used false names and “his structuring of single $18,000 
transactions” all showed a scheme to prevent the financial institutions from 
“fulfilling [its] legal duty.”78 
Contrary to the Tobon-Builes decision, the Anzalone decision held a 
defendant who purchased a total of twelve checks all of which aggregated 
to more than $100,000, but no single check exceeding $10,000 
individually, was not criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. section 2.79  The 
court held the defendant did not have fair warning or a duty to disclose.80  
 
 70   Linn, supra note 9, at 444. 
 71   Id.  
 72   Money Laundering Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1986); see United States v. 
Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 
676, 678-681 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 73   United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d at 1096-99 (11th Cir. 1983). 
 74   Id. 
 75   Id. at 1095. 
 76   Id. at 1096. 
 77   Id. at 1098.  
 78   Id.  
 79   United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 678-681 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 80   Id. 
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The court further stated “nothing on the face of either the Reporting Act . . . 
or . . . legislative history support[ed] the proposition that a ‘structured’ 
transaction by a customer constitute[ed] an [act].”81  In Anzalone, the 
defendant purchased several checks together totaling over $10,000 but 
never individually exceeding $10,000 on two separate occasions.82  The 
defendant argued the statute was constitutionally vague and it failed to give 
him proper notice.83 
In accepting the defendant’s vagueness argument, the court held § 
5313(a) of the statute was indeed vague because its provision relating to 
“any other participant in the transaction” does not specify whether it 
applies to individuals as well as to financial institutions.84  In siding with 
the defendant’s notice argument, the court also held the statute “imposed 
no duty on the defendant to inform the Bank of his ‘structured’ funds.”85  
Prior to Anzalone and Tobon-Builes, it does not seem that there was a 
united legislative voice to address the issue of structuring, but with the 
Money Laundering Control Act of 198686 there was a voice.  Further, 
Congress’ desire to expressly reject the Anzalone holding led to the 
enactment of the Money Laundering Control Act where Congress found 
those who structured criminally liable.87 
C. The Arrival of the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 and 
How it Augmented and Amended the Bank Secrecy Act 
The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 was amended by the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act in subtitle H.88  The MLCA was vital because it 
substantially augmented the BSA to combat money laundering.89  One 
augmentation was that the MLCA imposed and increased criminal penalties 
for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act.90  Specifically, criminal culpability 
 
 81   Id. 
 82   Id. at 679. 
 83   Id. at 680. 
 84   Id. at 681. 
 85   United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 682 (1st Cir. 1985). 
 86   18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1986). 
 87   Linn, supra note 9, at 440. 
 88   Id. 
 89   John K. Villa, A Critical View of Bank and the Money Laundering Statutes, 37 
CATH. U. L. REV. 489, 495 (1988) (explaining that the Money Laundering Control Act of 
1986 made amendments to the BSA and added two new money laundering provisions 
itself). 
 90   House Bill 5077; see also Villa, supra note 89 at 495 (The MLCA also added a new 
section to the BSA, which is known as the ‘anti-structuring statute.’ Section 5324(1) and (2) 
of the anti-structuring statute prohibit an individual from causing a financial institution 
either to fail to file a required report or to file a false report. Congress presumably intended 
these provisions to address the growing body of cases which have held that because the 
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was imposed on those individuals who knowingly assisted in money 
laundering or in structuring transactions to evade BSA’s requirements.91  
The MLCA also enhanced the BSA by increasing the maximum civil 
penalties for each violation.92  Penalties for knowingly violating the statute 
are either $25,000 or the amount of the transaction not exceeding 
$100,000.93  In addition, the penalty for negligently violating the statute is 
$500.94  The MLCA also required financial institutions, especially banks, to 
maintain comprehensive compliance programs.95 
The MLCA amended the BSA with the addition of section 5324 or the 
anti-structuring provision.96  Section 5324 applies primarily to financial 
institutions.97  On a macro scale, section 5324 deals with actions by 
individuals that adversely affect the reporting and recordkeeping 
requirements of financial institutions under the BSA.98  The intent of the 
MLCA was simple; make money laundering a crime and close the 
structuring loophole used to evade the BSA’s recording and recordkeeping 
requirements.99  The legislation was also enacted to address the perceived 
non-enforcement by banking regulatory agencies and the absence of banks’ 
compliance programs.100 
To better examine the prohibited actions, the current 
version of Section 5324(a) is: 
“Domestic Coin and Currency Transactions Involving 
Financial Institutions.—No person shall, for the purpose of 
evading the reporting requirements of section 5313(a) or 
5325 or any regulation prescribed under any such section, 
the reporting or recordkeeping requirements imposed by 
any order issued under section 5326, or the recordkeeping 
 
regulations promulgated under the BSA do not impose a duty on individuals to inform the 
bank of a reportable transaction, such a duty cannot be imposed in a criminal prosecution 
without violating the fair warning requirements of the due process clause of the fifth 
amendment.). 
 91   FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANKING SECRECY ACT 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL (2014). 
 92   31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987). 
 93   Id. 
 94   Id.  
 95   FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, BANKING SECRECY ACT 
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING EXAMINATION MANUAL (2014). 
 96   Villa, supra note 89, at 495.  
 97   31 U.S.C. § 5324 
 98   Id. 
 99   House Bill 5484; see also Recommendations for Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money 
Laundering Reform, American Bankers Association (Sept. 11, 2001) (on file with author). 
 100   Recommendations for Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering Reform, 
American Bankers Association (Sept. 11, 2001) (on file with author). 
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requirements imposed by any regulation prescribed under 
section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or section 
123 of Public Law 91–508— 
(1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial 
institution to fail to file a report required under section 
5313(a) or 5325 or any regulation prescribed under any 
such section, to file a report or to maintain a record 
required by an order issued under section 5326, or to 
maintain a record required under any regulation prescribed 
under section 21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or 
section 123 of Public Law 91–508; 
(2) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial 
institution to file a report required under section 5313(a) or 
5325 or any regulation prescribed under any such section, 
to file a report or to maintain a record required by any 
order issued under section 5326, or to maintain a record 
required under any regulation prescribed under section 
5326, or to maintain a record required under any regulation 
prescribed under section 21 of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act or section 123 of Public Law 91–508, that 
contains a material omission or misstatement of fact; or 
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to 
structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one 
or more domestic financial institutions.”101 
At the time of the enactment of section 5324, structuring was never 
formally defined nor was there a criminal penalty provision.102  Further, the 
prior version of section 5324 attached a “willful” requirement to a 
defendant’s mental culpability.103  After the enactment of section 5324 in 
1986, there were several amendments made to the statute but none more 
significant than the one following the Ratzlaf case.104 
D. The Influence of Ratzlaf v. United States on the Current Version of 
31 U.S.C. § 5324 
In Ratzlaf, the  Court was faced with the question of whether “a 
defendant’s purpose to circumvent a bank’s reporting obligation suffice[s] 
to sustain a conviction for ‘willfully violating’ the anti-structuring 
provision?”105  In a five-four decision, the Court in Ratzlaf held that “to 
 
 101   31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(1)-(4). 
 102   Villa, supra note 89, at 496; see also Linn, supra note 9, at 444. 
 103   Linn, supra note 9 at 440.  
 104   Linn, supra note 9, at 440-41. 
 105   Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137. 
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give effect to the statutory ‘willfulness’ specification [in 31 U.S.C. § 5322], 
the Government [must] prove [that the defendant] knew that the structuring 
he undertook was unlawful.”106 Another interpretation of the Court’s 
holding was that the government must prove both that the defendant knew 
of the bank’s duty to report cash transactions exceeding $10,000 and that 
failure to do so was a crime.107 
In Ratzlaf, the defendant attempted to evade the bank’s reporting 
requirements by purchasing individual cashier’s checks, each less than 
$10,000, from his total poker earnings of $100,000.108  As a result, the 
defendant was charged with structuring in violation of the reporting 
provisions under 31 U.S.C. §§ 5322(a) and 5324(3).109  On appeal to the 
Court, the defendant argued that he could not be convicted under the law’s 
“willful” requirement because he was unaware that structuring was a 
crime.110  The Court held even though the defendant admitted to structuring 
his cash transactions, congressional intent of “willfulness” mandated that 
the defendant’s knew of the bank’s reporting requirements and knew that 
structuring was a crime.111 In concluding, the Court stated its decision does 
not “dishonor the venerable principle that ignorance of the law generally is 
no defense,”112 but echoed that “had congress wished to dispense of the 
[willfulness] requirement” it would have done so.113 
Congress reacted to the Ratzlaf decision quickly and within ten 
months Congress superseded the ruling by statute.114  Congress amended 
section 5324 by deleting the statutory requirement of “willfulness” for all 
criminal prosecutions asserted under 31 U.S.C. § 5324.115 Under what 
became known as the “Ratzlaf fix,” prosecutors only have to prove that 
persons accused of structuring acted with the intent to evade the reporting 
requirements not that the person knew such requirements were a crime.116  
 
 106   Id. at 138. 
 107   Id. at 142. 
 108   Id. at 137.  
 109   Id. 
 110   Id. at 138. 
 111   Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 146-47 (1994).  
 112   Id. at 149. 
 113   Id. at 146. 
 114   Linn, supra note 9, at 447.  
 115   See Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-325, Sec. 411, 108 Stat. 2160, 2253 (amending Section 5324 to include its 
own criminal penalty provision, now codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)). 
 116   U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 2001-2009 (2018); see also 
Linn, supra note 9, at 447 (First, Congress amended 31 U.S.C. § 5322 to add a clause 
exempting violations of § 5324 from that statute’s reach. Second, Congress wrote a criminal 
penalty provision directly into § 5324 that omitted the willfulness requirement. Taken 
together, these amendments eliminated the basis on which the Supreme Court in Ratzlaf had 
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This helped clarified the intent question and we now turn to the issue of 
necessitating the minimum cash requirement in prosecutorial decision-
making. 
III. THE “CASH HOARD” DEFENSE AND ITS FAILED USES IN THE 
SPERRAZZA PREDECESSORS: VAN ALLEN AND SWEENEY 
One way a prosecutor proves a defendant has structured funds is to 
show that the defendant had a cash hoard exceeding $10,000.117  Typically 
in a case where the government prosecutes an individual who lacks the 
requisite $10,000 amount, the government usually proves intent based on 
either the pattern of deposits or with other evidence.118  The “cash hoard” 
issue comes into play because the defendant usually argues that because 
they lack the minimum cash, the prosecution should be barred from 
pursuing a case against them.119  In the structuring context, the rejection of 
the cash-hoard defense in United States v. Van Allen and United States v. 
Sweeney set the stage for a troubling rejection of the cash hoard defense in 
United States v. Sperrazza. 
A. The Predecessors: United States v. Van Allen and United States v. 
Sweeney 
In 2008, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Van 
Allen held there was sufficient evidence to find a defendant criminally 
liable for structuring under 31 U.S.C. § 5324 based on a pattern of 
deposits.120  In Van Allen, the defendant was an auto-parts businessman 
who in a span of two years deposited more than 3,000 checks totaling over 
$5.8 million with none of the checks exceeding $10,000.121  When 
questioned by the FBI, the defendant explained that his patterns of 
transactions were “to ‘avoid the aggravation’ of filing extra paperwork”.122  
At some point prior to his indictment, the defendant filed for bankruptcy 
and failed to disclose many of his financial assets as well as the money 
earned by his auto-parts business during the two years he made the check 
 
read the statute to require proof that a defendant knew structuring was a crime.). 
 117   Linn, supra note 9 at 462-63. See, e.g., United States v. Davenport, 929 F. 2d 1169 
(7th Cir. 1991).  
 118   Id. at 465-47; see also Courtney J. Linn, United States v. Sperrazza: An Appropriate 
Use of Federal Asset Forfeiture as Criminal Punishment, (March 18, 2016), https://s3.us-
east-2.amazonaws.com/washlegal-
uploads/upload/legalstudies/legalbackgrounder/031816LB_Linn.pdf 
 119   Blanch Law Firm, supra note 23. 
 120   United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 121   Id. at 818. 
 122   Id. at 817.  
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deposits.123  The defendant was eventually indicted on several counts 
including violations of the anti-structuring provision under 31 U.S.C. § 
5324(a)(3).124 
The defendant made two arguments in his defense: lack of evidence 
by the government125 and failure by the government to meet its burden of 
proof.126  The defendant argued “the only method of proving structuring is 
to demonstrate[] that [he] held a unitary cash hoard [of] over $10,000.”127  
In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the court held that the regulations 
intended for any transaction seeking to evade CTRs would be a violation of 
the law regardless of whether it involved amounts over $10,000.128  Though 
the court recognized its decision could punish small businesses dealing 
primarily in small amounts of cash under $10,000, the court fell short of 
accepting those repercussions.129 
In 2010, two years after the Van Allen decision, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals considered a similar “cash hoard” argument by 
defendants in United States v. Sweeney.130  In Sweeney, the Eighth Circuit 
held the defendants were criminally liable for structuring under 31 U.S.C. § 
5324 because the defendants knew about the reporting requirements and 
acted in a way to evade those reporting requirements.131  The indictment in 
Sweeney alleged that, in order to purchase a car, the defendant illegally 
structured $22,263.22 in cash by breaking up into varying amounts of 
$9,900 and other amounts less than the $10,000.132  The car dealer and bank 
tellers testified at trial that the defendants knew of the reporting 
requirements.133  The defendants were subsequently found guilty of 
structuring offenses relating to the car purchases.134 
 
 
 123   Id. at 818. 
 124   Id. 
 125   Id. at 819.  
 126   United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 820 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 127   Id. (“Primarily relying on United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 
1991), [defendant] argues that the only method of proving structuring is to demonstrate that 
a defendant held a unitary cash hoard over $ 10,000 and then broke it up to deposit in 
amounts under $ 10,000.). 
 128   Id. at 821. 
 129   Id. (finding that because the defendant moved over $5 million in the two years 
which he could not prove a legitimate business purpose for, “the fear raised” by the 
defendant did not apply.). 
 130   United States v. Sweeney, 611 F.3d 459, 472 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 131   Sweeney, 611 F.3d at 472. 
 132   Id. at 464-65. 
 133   Id.at 465.  
 134   Id. 
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The defendants made two structuring related defenses.135  First, the 
defendants argued the car purchase and bank withdrawal were not 
transactions recognized under the 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c)(3).136  Second, the 
defendants argued “break[ing] up a single cash transaction” above the 
$10,000 reporting requirement “into two or more separate transactions” 
was the only way to charge defendants with a structuring violation.137  
Relying on Van Allen, defendants argued prosecutors failed to show that a 
single transaction that exceeded $10,000 was broken up into smaller 
amounts.138  The Eight Circuit like Van Allen rejected the defendants’ 
argument, holding that the cash hoard theory was a sufficient but not 
necessary ground for prosecution.139  The court refused to narrowly 
interpret the statute citing the regulations’ expansive interpretation just as 
Van Allen did.140  The Sweeney court’s rejection of the cash hoard argument 
seemingly set the stage for United States v. Sperrazza five years later in 
2015. 
B. United States v. Sperrazza: The Majority 
In 2015, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction 
on tax evasion and structuring and held the “government may properly 
charge a defendant with structuring a transaction” under 31 U.S.C. § 
5324(a)(3) even if the defendant does not have more than $10,000.”141  In 
Sperrazza, the defendant as part of his practice outsourced his billing 
operations to a management firm.142  In return, the firm collected payments 
from Dr. Sperrazza’s patients and mailed Dr. Sperrazza checks every 
week.143  Approximately every ten days Dr. Sperrazza cashed about twenty 
to fifty of these checks per visit.144  The checks the defendant cashed often 
totaled more than $9,000 dollars but none ever exceeded $10,000.145  After 
law enforcement searched defendant’s home on an unrelated criminal 
investigation, an envelope labeled “clean” with about $24,000 in cash was 
 
 135   Id. 470-71. 
 136   United States v. Sweeney, 611 F.3d 459, 470-71 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 137   Id.  
 138   Id. at 471. 
 139   Id. 
 140   Id. (“The regulations explain that ‘[i]n any manner’ includes, but is not limited to, 
the breaking down of a single sum of currency exceeding $ 10,000 into smaller sums . . . or 
the conduct of a transaction, or series of currency transactions, including transactions at or 
below $ 10,000.’”). 
 141   United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1125 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 142   Sperrazza, 804 F.3d at 1117.  
 143   Id.  
 144   Id.  
 145   Id.  
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discovered.146  One of Dr. Sperrazza’s partners also admitted that Dr. 
Sperrazza told them he never cashed checks more than $10,000 because he 
wanted to avoid reports and IRS authorities.147  As a result, Dr. Sperrazza 
was convicted on five counts of tax evasion and structuring under 31 
U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3).148 
On appeal, the defendant made several arguments including that the 
structuring charges failed to state an offense and was therefore factually 
inaccurate.149  Sperrazza, like the defendants in Van Allen and Sweeney, 
argued there was no violation of the statute because it does not “allege he 
has a ‘cash hoard’ in excess of $10,000.”150  The court rejected this 
argument and cited both Van Allen and Sweeney, reasoning that the cash-
hoard requirement was not necessary to uphold a structuring conviction and 
that Dr. Sperrazza presented no contrary authority.151 
Dr. Sperrazza’s arguments were based on the Ratzlaf decision where 
the defendant there argued the need for a sum of money larger than 
$10,000 to be convicted of structuring.152  Like Sperrazza, the Ratzlaf Court 
also rejected this argument.153 The court also dismissed the dissent’s 
argument, that there needs to be at least $10,000 for a structuring charge, 
and highlighted two hypotheticals to support their argument. The 
hypotheticals are as follows: 
First, consider a defendant who has checks totaling 
$18,000 but decides to cash $9,000 today and $9,000 
tomorrow in order to avoid the reporting requirement; 
there can be no question the defendant may be charged 
with one count of structuring in violation of § 5324(a)(3).  
Second, consider the defendant who has checks totaling 
$9,000 and knows he will receive another bundle of checks 
totaling more than $1,000 tomorrow; in order to avoid the 
reporting requirement, he decides to cash the checks 
totaling $9,000 today.  We think the Government may 
charge the defendant in the second example with one count 
 
 146   Id. 
 147   United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 2015).  
 148   Id. 
 149   Id. at 1118.  
 150   Id. at 1121. 
 151   Id. at 1122 (citing United States v. Sweeney, 611 F.3d 459, 470 (8th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814, 821 (7th Cir. 2008) the court noted “We have 
never held all the transactions that make up a single count of structuring must have 
originated from a single cash hoard, and Sperrazza has not pointed to any case endorsing 
that rule. To the contrary, two circuits have expressly rejected the contention.”)). 
 152   Id. at 1123. 
 153   United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1123 (11th Cir. 2015). 
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of structuring even though he did not have more than 
$10,000 in hand at any one time.154 
In the end, the majority dismissed the dissent’s argument and held Dr. 
Sperrazza was still guilty of structuring. 
C. United States v. Sperrazza: The Dissent 
In Sperrazza, Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent could be summed into one 
statement: the defendant needs to have control of at least $10,000 before a 
structuring charge can be brought under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3).155  Though 
the dissenting opinion does ultimately agree with the majority’s outcome, it 
does not agree with its reasoning.156  The dissent argues the majority’s 
decision punishes someone who “goes to the bank too often.”157  Judge 
Rosenbaum further states the implications of the majority’s decision 
punishes someone for structuring no matter how small an amount of money 
that was controlled and this is not in line with congressional intent.158  In 
the dissent, Judge Rosenbaum cites that neither congressional intent nor the 
regulations support the majority’s opinion.159  Judge Rosenbaum also 
declared that the Van Allen and Sweeney cases were unpersuasive.160 
In arguing that the majority’s decision deviates from congressional 
intent, Judge Rosenbaum concluded that the statutory language of the 
structuring statute warrants transactions greater than $10,000.161  Using the 
Senate Report accompanying the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, 
Judge Rosenbaum maintained that there was no intention to include 
transactions not totaling $10,000.162  Ultimately Judge Rosenbaum 
completed her congressional intent analysis by highlighting that the 
commentary surrounding the statute clearly does not aim to punish 
 
 154   Id. at 1124 (explaining that the dissent’s argument that the defendant needs 
“control” of at least $10,000 was errant). 
 155   Id. 
 156   Id. at 1136 (Though I respectfully disagree with the Court’s broad construction of § 
5324(a)(3), I agree with the Court that the government nonetheless presented sufficient 
evidence to sustain a structuring conviction in this case under the definition of “structuring” 
that Congress intended. In fact, I would uphold conviction on two counts of structuring.). 
 157   Id. at 1129.  
 158   Id. (As a result of today’s ruling, in this Circuit, no  matter how small a sum of 
money a person may possess or otherwise enjoy a right to control—even if only a few 
dollars—he may find himself facing structuring charges if he goes to the bank often enough 
to create the appearance to the government of engaging in a pattern of financial transactions 
of $10,000 or less. I suppose that we will discover in the coming years how frequent a bank 
visitor one must be to imperil himself, but, in any case, it is clear today that § 5324(a)(3) has 
taken on a far broader reach than Congress ever intended.). 
 159   United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1129-32 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 160   Id. at 1134. 
 161   Id. at 1130. 
 162   Id. at 1131 (citing S. REP. NO. 99-433, at 22 (1986)). 
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someone who does not control at least $10,000.163 
 
In examining whether the regulations supported the majority, Judge 
Rosenbaum echoed the commentary of the Department of Treasury 
regulation.164  The dissent noted the statute was intended to address two 
issues: (1) financial institutions must report transactions involving at least 
$10,000 and (2) there to be a reportable sum of money.165  Judge 
Rosenbaum’s critique here characterizes the majority’s interpretation as 
overly broad and explains that the majority’s reading of the statute conflicts 
with congressional intent.166  In assessing Van Allen and Sweeney, Judge 
Rosenbaum expresses that neither of those decisions engaged in a deep 
analysis of statutory language or congressional intent but merely predicated 
their decisions on a statutory interpretation those courts developed 
themselves.167 
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section of the comment explains why the Sperrazza dissent 
accurately addresses the cash-hoard issue and analyzes the majority’s errant 
conclusion.  This section also highlights how the Sperrazza decision 
implicates the rule of lenity, the decision’s policy implications, the need for 
legislative action in addressing the issue, and recommendations for change. 
A. The Plain Language, Congressional Intent, and Rule of Lenity 
The majority’s decision in Sperrazza was in error because the 
statutory language is ambiguous. Accepting that the language is 
ambiguous, congressional intent necessitates a finding that a defendant be 
in control of the requisite $10,000 minimum. 
1. The Statutory Language is Ambiguous 
The majority deviates from the plain language of the statute and 
regulations because both sources consistently have the $10,000 requirement 
within its text.  The plain language rule allows consultation with 
extratextual sources only after a court has determined the statutory 
language is ambiguous.168  If the meaning of the text is plain, then no 
 
 163   Id. 
 164   Id. at 1133. 
 165   United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1133 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 166   Id. at 1134. 
 167   Id.  
 168   Matthew J. Hertko, Statutory Interpretation in Illinois: Abandoning the Plain 
Meaning Rule for an Extratextual Approach, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 377, 379 (2005). 
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outside information is allowed.169  Even the Court in Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill, has stated “when confronted with a statute which is plain 
and unambiguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legislative 
history to guide its meaning.”170  Often the rule is invoked when courts 
want to prohibit reliance on a specific type of outside source.171  These 
outside sources include legislative history, policy considerations, practice, 
and other substantive cannons.172  The plain language rule does not 
categorically aim to excuse the use of outside sources, but rather to make 
these sources irrelevant because the statute’s language is plain.173 
Using the principles from statutory interpretation, the structuring 
statute will be analyzed. The pertinent part the structuring provision under 
the regulation states structuring involves but is not limited to: 
the breaking down of a single sum of currency 
exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums, including sums at or 
below $10,000 or the conduct of a transaction or series of 
currency transactions at or below $10,000. The transaction 
or transactions need not exceed the $10,000 reporting 
threshold at any single financial institution any single day 
in order to constitute structuring within the meaning of this 
definition.174 
The $10,000 requirement is seen four times in the short provision of 
the regulations discussing what structuring means.175  The statutory 
provision under 31 U.S.C. section 5324 does not specify a dollar amount 
needed to structure.176  The language of the statute under subsection (a)(3) 
states it is a crime to “structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to 
structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic 
financial institutions,” providing no guidance of whether the individual 
must possess the $10,000 requirement. 177 
The definitional provision under 31 U.S.C. section 5312 also does not 
provide guidance as to whether an individual needs to have control of at 
least $10,000 as a condition for structuring, thereby making the language of 
the statute even more ambiguous.178  The only mention of any dollar 
 
 169   William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 539, 540 (2017). 
 170   Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 n. 29 (1978). 
 171   Baude, supra note 169, at 543. 
 172   Baude, supra note 169 at 543–46. 
 173   Baude, supra note 169 at 545. 
 174   31 C.F.R. § 1010.100 (2018); see also 31. U.S.C. § 5324(a). 
 175   See Id. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.100 (2018). 
 176   31 U.S.C. § 53249(a). 
 177   Id. 
 178   31 U.S.C. § 5312. 
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amount under the definitional section pertains to requiring casinos with a 
revenue of more than $1,000,000 to file transaction reports.179  A further 
analysis of the statute shows it is subject to differing interpretations.180  On 
one hand, the consistent mention of $10,000 throughout the language of the 
regulation strongly suggests it is a requirement, especially considering the 
“exceeding $10,000” language.181  On the other hand, the words “but is not 
limited to” also suggest that the individual may not necessarily be required 
to have at least $10,000 in hand when structuring.182  The prefatory term 
“but is not limited to” typically means a list of non-exhaustive examples183 
so it is entirely possible that the $10,000 requirement is not mandatory.  
These two possible interpretations strongly suggest that the statute may be 
ambiguous, and though the dissent never expressly says so, it can be 
inferred from that opinion.184 
The dissent argues the breaking down or “split[ing] up” requirements 
of the statute mean the individual must possess an amount greater than or at 
least $10,000.185  The dissent used the dictionary definition of “splitting up” 
to argue that the person needs to have control of more than $10,000 before 
one can structure the transaction in the legal sense.186  The dissent notes the 
minimum $10,000 cash requirement is embedded in the statute as the 
statute also requires that there is at least $10,000.01 before a bank must file 
a transaction report.187  Though the dissent’s conclusion and reasoning are 
sound, the dissent at times over-relies on congressional intent without 
clearly expressing what that intent is.188 
2. Congressional Intent is Needed 
The dissent expressed that Congress did not intend for the anti-
structuring statute to cover transactions where the person did not control at 
least $10,000.189  In examining congressional intent, the dissent highlighted 
 
 179   Id. 
 180   31 C.F.R. § 101.100 (2018). 
 181   Id.  
 182   Id.  
 183   Ken Adams, An Update on “Including But Not Limited To”, Adams on Contract 
Drafting, (Sep. 14. 2015), https://www.adamsdrafting.com/an-update-on-including-but-not-
limited-to/. 
 184   United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1130 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 185   Id.  
 186   Id.  
 187   Id.  
 188   Id. at 1131 (dissent notes “[E]ven to the extent that § 5324(c)(3) may be viewed as 
ambiguous . . .  the legislative intent is perfectly clear.”). 
 189   Sperrazza, 804 F.3d at 1130 (“I respectfully disagree with the Majority’s approach. 
This interpretation does not account for the phrase splitting up an amount of currency that 
would not be reportable if the full amount were involved in a single transaction[.] . . . The 
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an example discussed by the Senate report discussing that a person who 
converted $18,000 into smaller amounts will be guilty of structuring, 
suggesting that the person needs possession of more than $10,000.190  The 
dissent also notes the example in the Senate report where a person who 
breaks down $2,000 into four transactions of $500 was not subject to 
liability under the law, thereby bolstering the $10,000 possession 
argument.191  Primarily, the dissent here argues the $10,000 requirement is 
needed at the outset of the conduct not at the endpoint as the majority 
errantly held.192 
The commentary from the Senate report also strongly suggests that 
Congress intended that before a person be charged with structuring, the 
person must have control of at least $10,000.193 Remarks from Mr. Keating 
II, then Assistant Secretary of Enforcement at the Department of Treasury 
notes that “this bill would prohibit structuring of currency transactions to 
avoid the $10,000 currency transactions reporting requirement.”194  The 
Assistant Secretary even reported that he would not favor lowering the 
$10,000 limit for filing CTRs.195  The commentary alone seems insufficient 
to reach the conclusion that an individual needs control of the $10,000 
minimum requirement.  However, when coupled with the Senate Report 
cited in Sperrazza’s dissent, it can be reasonably inferred that without the 
$10,000 requirement there is no prosecution possible.196 
 
 
phrase lays bare congressional intent that a person necessarily controls a hoard of more than 
$10,000 before she can structure transactions. To “split” means “[t]o separate . . .; 
disunite.” . . . A person cannot disunite something that does not yet exist. Instead, as the two 
examples in the commentary illustrate—one involving the splitting up of $18,000 into two 
transactions of $9,000 each and the other involving the splitting up of $2,000 into four 
transactions of $500 each—a united whole must first exist before it can be disunited. We are 
not at liberty to construe the statute more broadly than it was written and then we know 
Congress intended. But that is what the Court’s opinion does today in holding that a person 
may violate , even if he lacks control over more than $10,000.”). Judge Rosenbaum in her 
dissent argued that Congress did not intend for the anti-structuring statute to cover 
transactions where the person did not have control of at least $10,000. 
 190   United States v. Sperrazza, 804 F.3d 1113, 1131 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 191   Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 99-433, 22 (1986). 
 192   Id.  
 193   Id.  
 194   Assistant Secretary Keating II commented that the bill would specifically prohibit 
structuring transactions to avoid the $10,000 reporting requirement, The Drug Money 
Seizure Act and The Bank Secrecy Act Amendments: Hearing Before The Senate Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1986). 
 195   Id. (noting that Assistant Treasury Secretary John K. Walker, Jr. and Assistant 
Secretary Francis A. Keating II reported to Congress that they would not favor lowering the 
$10,000 but rather would urge compliance with existing laws and regulations to encourage 
coordination between the government and financial institutions). 
 196   Sperrazza, 804 F.3d at 1132. 
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3. Rule of Lenity Favors the $10,000 Requirement 
The rule of lenity allows an ambiguous criminal statute to be read in 
favor of the defendant.197 The rule rests on various assumptions: (1) only 
Congress may legitimately define crime; (2) there is a fair warning 
requirement of legal or illegal behavior an accused must know before the 
accused may be criminally punished; and, (3) criminal statutes should be 
construed narrowly to counter risks of prosecutorial overreach.198  The late 
Justice Scalia described the rule of lenity arising when there is a tie in the 
interpretation of an ambiguous criminal statute, the defendant must win that 
tie.199  Justice Scalia argued Due Process would prohibit holding citizens 
accountable for violating a statute “whose commands are uncertain or 
subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed.”200 
i. Brief History on Lenity 
The rule of lenity originates in old English criminal law which 
shielded clergy members from criminal liability.201  During the middle 
ages, it was known as the “benefit of clergy” rule, because clergymen were 
afforded certain benefits.202  For example, it allowed clergymen to avoid the 
death penalty.203  By the end of the thirteenth century the rule applied to all 
major crimes not only felonies.204  Over the next two centuries, the rule not 
only benefitted clergy but also benefited any individual who could read.205  
Given the severity of the death penalty for petty crimes and its effect on 
 
 197   Bouvier Law Dictionary Lenity (Rule of Lenity). 
 198   Sanford Greenberg, Who Says It’s a Crime?: Chevron Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Regulatory Statutes that Creates Criminal Liability, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 
3; 15 (1996) (“The lenity doctrine has a three-part rationale: legislative supremacy, the idea 
that only Congress has the authority to define behavior subject to criminal sanction; fair 
warning; and separation of powers.”). 
 199   This case, now overturned by statute, presented to the Court about whether the word 
“proceeds” in the Money Laundering Control Act or 18 U.S.C. § 1956 should be interpreted 
broadly to mean “receipts”. While the plurality opinion by Justice Scalia stated it did, 
Congress shortly amended the statute in 2009 to define proceeds as “gross receipts”. The 
Santos case will be used solely to highlight Justice Scalia’s definition and discussion of the 
rule of lenity not to discuss the majority’s decision; United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 
514 (2008). 
 200   Id. 
 201   Phillip M. Spector, The Sentencing Rule of Lenity, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 511, 514-15 
(2002). 
 202   Id. at 514. 
 203   Id. at 515 (discussing that all felonies in the Middle Ages were punishable by 
death.). 
 204   Id.  
 205   Id. 
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petty criminals, judges narrowly construed criminal statutes.206  It is worth 
noting that the rule’s past application in earlier British time was limited to 
sentencing, but its application in American tradition was much broader.207 
In America, the rule was first invoked in United States v. Sheldon 
where the Court refused to apply a statute criminalizing the transportation 
of articles of provision from United States to Canada to a defendant who 
herded oxen.208  The Court in Sheldon warned against interpreting criminal 
law by equity so as to extend it to cases that are not within the statute’s 
ordinary meaning.209  Three years later the Court invoked the lenity rule in 
concluding that a federal manslaughter statute for killing on the high seas 
does not apply to a defendant who killed someone while on a river.210  Even 
though the Court invoked the rule in these cases, there was no clear 
evidence demanding the rule’s application in sentencing case as there was 
in ancient England.211 However, things changed following the 1950s when 
the Court started to invoke the rule in a sentencing context.212  One of these 
cases involved the Fair Labor Standards Act where the Court interpreted 
this statute to impose penalties for individuals’ entire conduct not just 
penalties for each violation of the statute.213  The most vibrant invocation of 
the rule to sentencing cases was the United States v. R.L.C. case where the 
Court needed to determine whether a juvenile should be sentenced under 
the statutory maximum or under the sentencing guidelines maximum.214  In 
holding that the sentencing guidelines penalty applies, the Court held that 
the “rule has been applied not only to resolve issues about the substantive 
scope of criminal statutes, but to answer questions about the severity of 
sentencing.”215 
ii. Recent SCOTUS take on Lenity 
Even in recent years the Supreme Court continues to apply rule of 
lenity, indicating the rule’s continued significance and acceptance as a tool 
for interpretation.  For example, the rule of lenity has been invoked under 
the Armed Career Criminal Act which states that a defendant convicted of 
being a felon in possession of a firearm will face a minimum fifteen year 
term if they have three or more previous state or federal convictions for a 
 
 206   Id. at 518. 
 207   Spector supra note 201, at 518. 
 208   United States v. Sheldon, 15 U.S. 119, 121 (1817). 
 209   Id. 
 210   United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76, 93 (1820). 
 211   Spector, supra note 201, at 526. 
 212   Id. at 527. 
 213   United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952). 
 214   United States v. R. L. C., 503 U.S. 291, 294-96 (1992). 
 215   Id. at 309. 
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violent felony or serious drug offense.216  In 2007 and 2008, the Court 
invoked the rule of lenity to eliminate a possible statutory construction of 
the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act’s sentencing 
enhancement for certain gun crimes.217  In James v. United States, the Court 
held that attempted burglary as defined under Florida law was a violent 
felony for purposes of the ACCA.218  In Begay v. United States, the Court 
held that driving under the influence was a not a “violent felony” for 
purposes of the ACCA.219 
Even a few terms ago, the Court considered statutory interpretation 
questions where they did not expressly mention the rule of lenity, but it 
discussed the implications of lenity raising concerns about prosecutorial 
overreach as well examining whether the statutes had legislative support.220  
In McDonnell v. United States,221 the Court unanimously held that a 
governor does commit an “official act” for purposes of a federal bribery 
statute even though the governor accepted loans and gifts, attended 
meetings, hosted events, arranged meetings, and contacted officials.  These 
recent lines of cases show at the very least the Court invokes the rule of 
lenity, examines its effects on ambiguous statutes, and is concerned about 
the lenity implications. 
iii. The Rule of Lenity in Sperrazza 
In Sperrazza, the dissent argued that the rule of lenity does not 
tolerate the majority’s interpretation of section 5324(a)(3) of the Bank 
Secrecy Act.222  The dissent argued the rule of lenity should apply favoring 
the defendant.223  The dissent notes in the presence of two interpretations, 
one harsh and the other lenient, the rule of lenity should govern unless 
Congress is clear.224  Ultimately, the dissent concluded the statute covers 
only those transactions that originate from the defendant’s control of funds 
exceeding $10,000.225  Since the language of the statute is ambiguous, 
application of the rule of lenity warrants reading the statute with leniency 
 
 216   Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C § 924(e) (1984).  
 217   These two decisions have now been overturned but their lenity analysis remains 
intact. See, James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 
137 (2008). 
 218   James, 550 U.S. at 214. 
 219   Begay, 553 U.S. at 154. 
 220   Zachary Price, The Court after Scalia: The Rule of Lenity, SCOTUSblog, (Sept. 2, 
2016), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-scalia-and-the-rule-of-
lenity/ 
 221   McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016). 
 222   Sperrazza, 804 F. 3d at 1136. 
 223   Id. 
 224   Id.  
 225   Id. 
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in favor of defendants.226 
iv. Lenity Implications? 
In Sperrazza, the rule of lenity may not have been helpful because 
there was other evidence sufficient to find Dr. Sperrazza guilty of 
structuring as the dissent rightfully concludes.227 However, if one were 
dealing with a defendant in a case where there was significantly less 
evidence of structuring, the doctrine of lenity brings several concerns to the 
forefront.228  For example, there is the possibility prosecutors unfairly elect 
to enforce criminal laws with an ambiguous statute such as section 5324.229  
Invoking the rule also helps ensure accountability for prosecutor’s charging 
decisions.230  Invoking the rule could allow charging decisions to be 
reviewed more easily based on the specific definition as opposed to an 
ambiguous one.231  Another way lenity will affect charging decisions is it 
will make the true nature of the crime facially apparent rather than burying 
some details in the conviction or plea agreement.232  Lenity also helps 
ensure there is a general support for a criminal statute that is being 
enforced.233  The rule ensures lawmakers will be held accountable by 
exposing them to either ridicule, critic, or resistance from the law they 
enact; they cannot hide from public pressure by constructing a vague 
statute.234 
B. The Policy Implications of the Sperrazza Majority’s Not so Plain 
Meaning Interpretation 
One of the major policy implications of the Sperrazza decision is 
prosecutorial overreach.235  Structuring charges are usually criticized as 
opening the door to prosecutorial overreach.236  In cases where the 
 
 226   Id. 
 227   Id. 
 228   Greenberg, supra note 198, at 19. 
 229   Greenberg, supra note 198, at 19; see 31 U.S.C. § 5324. 
 230   Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity As A Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 
940 (2004). 
 231   Price, supra note 230, at 940.  
 232   Zachary Price, The Court after Scalia: The Rule of Lenity, SCOTUSblog, (Sept. 2, 
2016), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/09/the-court-after-scalia-scalia-and-the-rule-of-
lenity/ 
 233   Id. 
 234   Price, supra note 230, at 911.  
 235   Stewart Bishop, High Court Passes on Fla. Doc’s Deposit Structuring Appeal, 
LAW360, (June 13, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/806449/high-court-passes-on-
fla-doc-s-deposit-structuring-appeal. 
 236   Post, supra note 8.  
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defendant does not have the requisite cash hoard, two issues arise.237  First, 
the government must primarily rely on a pattern of deposits which is not 
always reliable to show criminal intent.238  In other words, if the 
government solely relies on a pattern of transaction, this could capture 
individuals who structure but lack the criminal intent.239  For cases 
involving actors with a pattern of transactions resembling structuring, a thin 
line between determining innocuous or felonious activity develops.240 
Even though the Sperrazza majority highlighted the “innocent actor” 
implication,  the court in error suggested an innocent actor would not be 
subject to criminal liability under its ruling.241 The court on this point 
reasoned an innocent actor lacks the criminal intent needed, but does not 
explain how that relieves them from being implicated within the statute.242  
The court’s conclusion is not entirely true because to determine intent, the 
government may need to show either direct evidence such there was in 
Sperrazza or circumstantial evidence, which could be a pattern of deposits.  
If the government uses solely a pattern of circumstantial evidence, then the 
innocent actors described in Sperrazza could be implicated as well. 
C. Why the Legislature is More Apt at Addressing the Cash Hoard 
Defense 
The legislature may be more apt at addressing the cash hoard defense 
issue in Sperrazza as the Supreme Court has denied certiorari of 
Sperrazza’s appeal.243  In an opposition brief by the United States 
Government, then Solicitor General Donald Verrilli argued that based on 
precedent from other appellate courts addressing the cash hoard defense, 
the Sperrazza decision was in line.244  In other words, the government 
 
 237   Linn, supra note 9, at 465. 
 238   Id. 
 239   Id. 
 240   Balko, supra note 32.  
 241   Sperrazza, 804 F.3d at 1124. 
 242   Id.  
 243   Bishop, supra note 235. 
 244   Brief for the United States in Opposition at 12, On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, United States v. Sperrazza, 
804 F. 3d 1113 (2016) (No. 15-966). Then Solicitor General Donald Verrilli made several 
arguments including that this case and appeal were a 1) “particularly poor vehicle for 
addressing petitioner’s claim because, . . .  [the] petitioner on dozens of occasions 
simultaneously controlled more than $10,000 in cash and checks, but deliberately ‘chose to 
transact in cash amounts under $10,000’” 2) That “petitioner [did not] claim that such a 
“cash hoard” requirement exist[ed]” and 3) “Here by contrast, the jury’s finding that 
petitioner acted with the necessary mens rea was supported not only by evidence that he 
engaged in so many cash transactions just below $10,000—yet never above that limit— but 
also by petitioner’s own words: petitioner told his partner that he handled his finances in 
such an unorthodox manner ‘to avoid any reports or anything that would involve . . .  the 
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argued because there was no circuit split on the issue, the Court did not 
need to address it and thereby should deny Sperrazza’s petition for 
certiorari.245 
Based on the Court’s decision to deny certiorari, it seems the Court 
has no interest at least for now to address whether an individual who never 
possesses more than $10,000 could be charged with structuring under 31 
U.S.C. 5324 absent direct evidence of intent.246  Therefore, the legislature is 
the next logical actor for the issue.  A few years ago Senators Feinstein and 
Grassley proposed a bill titled: Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist 
Financing, and Counterfeiting Act of 2017.247  Though the bill does not 
address the cash hoard defense, it addresses other structuring provisions 
within the BSA.248  The attempt by these Senators suggests that there could 
be bi-partisan efforts to address money laundering issues including the 
minimum cash requirement issue. Therefore, the Court’s denial of certiorari 
implicitly shows the Court’s unwillingness to address the cash hoard issue 
while the bi-partisan efforts in Congress shows Congress’ willingness to 
make some substantive changes. 
D. Recommendations 
The ambiguity currently within the statute could be fixed by defining 
key statutory provisions and rewriting or rephrasing some wording within 
the statute.  Unfortunately, similar state statutes provide no help.  Below, 
the necessary recommendations to the statute will be expressed including 
how the statute should look given all of the concerns highlighted in 
previous sections of this comment. 
1. Possession Defined 
First, the word possess must be defined.  The statute in its current 
form does not define possession or control.  Therefore, dictionary 
definitions and other criminal statutory provisions will inform on how to 
define these terms.  Possession means: 
Detention and control, or the manual or ideal custody, 
of any- thing which may be the subject of property, for 
one’s use and enjoyment, either as owner or as the 
proprietor of a qualified right in it, and either held 
personally or by another who exercises it in one’s place 
 
regulatory or IRS authorities.’” (citing Pet. App. 3a.). 
 245   Id. 
 246   Id.  
 247   Combating Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Counterfeiting Act of 2017, 
S. 1241, 115th Cong. (2017). 
 248   Id.  
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and name.249 
In the context of criminal law, possession can be either actual or 
constructive possession.250  Actual possession means that an individual has 
immediate and direct physical control over the item or property.251  With 
the revised suggestion, in the context of the structuring provision, the 
individual would need to be in either physical possession of the required 
$10,000 or have at least $10,000 in that individual’s bank account which is 
then withdrawn and broken up into smaller amounts to structure.  
Constructive possession involves a situation where the individual does not 
have direct possession of the item or property but has the intent and ability 
to control such item.252 
Applying the structuring provision, the individual will need to have 
the intent and ability to control the required $10,000, though direct 
possession of the funds is not necessary.  For example, if the individual 
orders an agent, be it a lawyer or financial advisor, to take the required 
$10,000 and break it into smaller chunks, then the individual will also be 
culpable.  The issue of whether the $10,000 must be cash or securities will 
not be addressed because the definitional section of the statute provides 
what is a monetary instrument.253 
2. The Fixer 
Second, we must addressed which branch of government is in the best 
position to amend the statute or at least provide immediate clarity.  
Typically Congress makes necessary amendments to statutes.254  However, 
the Court and government agencies can also provide guidance in 
interpretations which may be useful while congressional action awaits.255 A 
key solution is to amend the statute to read that one could only be charged 
 
 249   Possession, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 2016). 
 250   Umansky Law Firm, Court Upholds Questionable Interpretation of Constructive 
Possession, https://www.thelawman.net/Press-Room/Court-Upholds-Questionable-
Interpretation-of-Constructive-Possession/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2019). 
 251  Id. 
 252   Id. 
 253   See 31 U.S.C. § 5312 (defining monetary instruments as “(A)United States coins 
and currency; (B)as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation, coins and currency of a 
foreign country, travelers’ checks, bearer negotiable instruments, bearer investment 
securities, bearer securities, stock on which title is passed on delivery, and similar material; 
and (C)as the Secretary of the Treasury shall provide by regulation for purposes of sections 
5316 and 5331, checks, drafts, notes, money orders, and other similar instruments which are 
drawn on or by a foreign financial institution and are not in bearer form.”) 
 254   The White House, The Legislative Branch, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-
white-house/the-legislative-branch/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) (discussing the role of 
Congress in American law). 
 255   Supreme Court of the United States, The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/constitutional.aspx (last visited Apr. 5, 2019).  
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with structuring if he or she possesses the required $10,000.  Since 
legislative enactment is usually a process that is not immediate, in the 
interim the Department of Justice could release an opinion letter or 
advisory opinion.  Assuming the first two solutions fail, bringing a test case 
to a lower court may also be a potential avenue to address the issue.256 
3. The Old and Improved 
The statutory provision relating to the $10,000 
requirement in its present form reads— 
 
the breaking down of a single sum of currency 
exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums, including sums at or 
below $10,000 or the conduct of a transaction or series of 
currency transactions at or below $10,000. The transaction 
or transactions need not exceed the $10,000 reporting 
threshold at any single financial institution any single day in 
order to constitute structuring within the meaning of this 
definition.257 
 
The statute in its ideal form will read— 
 
An individual is guilty of structuring if the individual 
possesses and splits up the requisite $10,000 in monetary 
instruments as defined by 31 U.S.C. § 5312 of this chapter, 
into smaller amounts at the onset, with the intent to cause or 
attempt to cause  a financial institution to fail to file a 
currency transaction report, though the individual does not 
need to know the consequences of the financial institution’s 
failure. The transaction need not exceed the $10,000 
reporting threshold at any single financial institution any 
single day in order to constitute structuring within the 
meaning of this definition. In a case where the individual 
does not have the requisite $10,000, direct evidence must be 
provided to show the individual acted with the intent to 
cause or attempt to cause the financial institution to fail to 
file the currency transaction report. 
Therefore, the revised statute would ensure prosecutors will not solely 
 
 256   Govtrack, Statistics and Historical Comparison, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Apr. 5, 2019) (highlighting 
statistics of congressional legislation introduced versus those enacted dating back to 1974). 
 257   31 U.S.C. § 5234. 
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rely on a pattern of transactions to prosecute cases where the defendant 
does not have the minimum cash requirement. 
4. No Help from the States 
Examining current state structuring statutes as a model for the federal 
statute is not helpful because the state structuring laws are a replica of 
federal law.  For example, in New Jersey the structuring statute makes no 
mention of a monetary amount or whether an individual need to have 
control of at least $10,000.258  A reading of the New Jersey law shows that 
it is almost a verbatim adoption of the federal language, so it seems that 
looking to states, at least New Jersey will not be of much help.259 
5. New Law to Sperrazza Facts 
Would Dr. Sperrazza have been guilty under the suggested statute? 
Based on the new law, Dr. Sperrazza would be still be guilty for several 
reasons.  First, Dr. Sperrazza has immediate physical control over the 
requisite $10,000 with the intent to structure the checks to evade taxes. 
Even if Dr. Sperrazza’s argues he did not have direct possession because an 
outside firm handled the funds, Dr. Sperrazza still had the requisite 
constructive possession.260  Further, checks are monetary instruments by the 
statute’s definitional section so any argument to the contrary would be 
errant.261  Applying to suggested statute to the Sperrazza facts though there 
is no evidence Mr.  Sperrazza’s transaction exceeded the requisite $10,000 
at any single time, there will be sufficient direct evidence to find Dr. 
Sperrazza culpable under the new statute.  One piece of evidence was the 
envelope in his home found by law enforcement labeled “clean” cash 
totaling $24,000.  Another piece of evidence was the testimony of 
Sperrazza’s partner expressing that the doctor structured to avoid reports 
and IRS authorities.  Therefore, even under the revised statute Dr. 
Sperrazza would be guilty. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the current language of the statute is ambiguous, 
congressional intent and rules of statutory interpretation suggests that an 
individual need to be in control of at least $10,000 to be charged with 
structuring.  The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Sperrazza, rejecting this 
proposition, sweeps innocent individuals who neither intend to violate the 
statute nor attempt to hide any underlying criminal conduct.  The Court’s 
 
 258   N.J. STAT. ANN. Section 2C:21-25.  
 259   Id. 
 260   Sperrazza, 804 F.3d at 1117. 
 261   31 U.S.C. § 5312. 
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decision to errantly deny certiorari does not help answer this pending 
question of whether an individual could be charged for structuring solely 
based on a pattern of transactions when they lack the requisite $10,000 
statutory requirement. Since there is judicial silence on this issue, the 
burden should now fall on Congress to attempt to provide an answer.  
While not every individual who structures money and possesses less than 
the $10,000 requirement is innocent, the chances of innocent individuals 
being punished are too great. There soon needs to clear action from either 
the legislative or judicial branch.  If not, a restaurant owner who goes to the 
bank every week to deposit $9,000 dollars to avoid carrying copious 
amounts of cash and to avoid robbers could be guilty of a crime absent 
greater evidence of intent. Even a bartender who makes about $2,000-
$2,500 a week in tip but never over $10,000 a month could also be guilty of 
a crime.  Our system of criminal justice hopefully cares enough to prevent 
such charges and convictions. 
 
